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10 
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE: FIXING THE 
LICENSING PROBLEM 
G.S. Hans*† 
Recent technological advances have allowed consumers to reinvent the 
mixtape. Instead of being confined to two sides of an audiocassette, people 
can now create playlists that stretch for hours and days on their computers, 
tablets, mobile devices, and MP3 players. This, in turn, has affected how 
people consume and listen to music, both in isolation and in groups. 
As individuals and business owners in the United States use devices to 
store, organize, and listen to music, they inevitably run up against the 
boundaries of U.S. copyright law. In general, these laws affect businesses 
more often than private individuals, who can listen to the latest hit single on 
their iPod or play music to a large audience in their home without running 
afoul of copyright law, presuming that the audience is composed of family 
members and social acquaintances.1 In contrast, as soon as a business plays 
music in a public space where strangers might listen, it risks infringing the 
public performance right granted to rightsholders by copyright law.2 
This Essay examines how business practices attributable to the rise of 
digital music conflict with the public performance right that the Copyright 
Act grants to creators. This Essay begins by examining the ways in which 
many commercial businesses might violate public performance rights by 
using digital music players in their establishments, and discusses how the 
public performance right governs such use. For example, under the 
Copyright Act, businesses that broadcast a radio station and are relatively 
small in scale do not infringe the exclusive rights granted to rightsholders; 
however, a parallel exemption does not exist for music played from a digital 
music player. Next, the Essay builds on the work of scholars who propose a 
tax to compensate rightsholders for public performances, rather than using 
                                                                                                                            
 * J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2012; M.S. in Information, University of 
Michigan School of Information, 2012. With thanks to Professors Peter DiCola and Jessica 
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 † Suggested Citation: G.S. Hans, Public Performance Rights in the Digital Age: 
Fixing the Licensing Problem, 111 Mich L. Rev First Impressions 10 (2012), http:// 
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 1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 2. Id. §§ 106(4), 106(6). 
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infringement suits or blanket licenses. Finally, this Essay concludes by 
discussing possible objections to a mandatory tax regime, how a mandatory 
tax regime might be implemented, and the likelihood of adopting such a 
regime. 
I. Origins and Management of the Public Performance  
Right in Music 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants exclusive rights to copyright 
holders.3 Of the six exclusive rights enumerated in section 106, two involve 
public performance.4 The specific boundaries of the public performance 
right depend on what one considers a “public performance.” The Copyright 
Act defines public performance as performing or displaying a work in a 
manner open to the public or where persons besides family members and 
social acquaintances might witness it.5 Under the terms of the Act, one could 
perform a work for 200 family members and social acquaintances in an 
expansive backyard and not publicly perform the work under the statutory 
definition.6 Even looking only at the text, the statute’s concept of public 
performance might defy common conception—some Americans would 
certainly consider a backyard performance to 200 people to be “public.” 
The Copyright Act’s public/private distinction raises the normative issue 
of why public performance even deserves special protection via the grant of 
an exclusive right. If a family brings a portable stereo to play music at a 
private family picnic, American copyright law deems such action legal until 
the volume becomes loud enough for a stranger to overhear it, at which point 
the performance of the music becomes “public.” In practice, this scenario is 
probably legal under various exceptions granted by the Copyright Act.7 But 
why is this determination made on the basis of a “public” / “private” 
audience distinction, rather than the location, for example? While some line 
drawing is necessary in separating “public” from “private,” the current 
statutory definition implicates complex metaphysical questions and makes 
enforcement of the public performance right seemingly arbitrary in some 
circumstances. 
                                                                                                                            
 3. Id. § 106. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. § 101. 
 6. Because the statutory definition of public performance only implicates 
performances attended by “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances,” confining an event to friends and family will not 
implicate the public performance right. However, allowing even one stranger (or a friend of a 
friend) to attend could conceivably transform the event into a public performance. See id.; 17 
U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006). 
 7. The most obvious exception would be the fair use right granted by 17 U.S.C. § 107, 
but the language in 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) probably inoculates this type of performance. 
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In practice, performance rights organizations (“PRO”s) have become the 
preferred method for licensing and enforcement of public performance 
rights. There are three PROs in the United States: the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP); Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI); and SESAC. Rightsholders grant their public performance rights to a 
PRO, which then licenses and enforces those rights. These PROs are 
collective rights agencies: they grant blanket licenses to businesses 
permitting them to play all of their clients’ music in a public setting, rather 
than requiring the businesses to negotiate with each individual rightsholder. 
These license agreements provide for the collection of fees from business 
owners. In turn, the PROs pass on those fees to rightsholders (after 
deducting administrative fees). 
According to Nimmer on Copyright, most PRO infringement suits 
follow the same procedural posture. A PRO will repeatedly warn an alleged 
offender that it is violating the public performance right. If the business 
refuses to sign a contract granting it blanket rights in exchange for paying 
fees to the PRO, the PRO will file suit and generally will win.8 However, the 
Copyright Act creates special exemptions and conditions under which a 
PRO license is not necessary for public performance of copyrighted 
material. 
One such exemption is particularly relevant for small businesses.9 If the 
business meets certain requirements—most notably, if they play music 
transmitted via a radio or television station licensed by the Federal 
Communications Commission and meets certain physical restrictions—it 
will not need to purchase a public performance license. Business owners 
might have once been content to tune their stereos to a radio station, thus 
falling within a section 110 exemption. But the rise of digital music and 
portable music devices has made this option less appealing. The power to 
control the next song via a digital music player may be more enticing than 
relying on the whims of a DJ. Unfortunately, such practices open the door to 
an infringement suit. 
II. The Problem of Digital Public Performance 
A. The PROs and Digital Music Enforcement 
The § 110(5)(B) exemption to the public performance right generally 
does not apply to playing songs off of devices like iPods, smartphones, and 
laptops in a business. Unfortunately, business owners who supply music to 
                                                                                                                            
 8. 2-8 Melville B. Nimmer & David N. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.19 
(2011). 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(b). 
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customers via such devices often do not realize that they are violating 
copyright law. Perhaps business owners believe that by playing music files 
that they own, they can rely on the first sale doctrine (allowing them to do 
whatever they wish with music, once that music is acquired). However, this 
belief is contrary to the Copyright Act. The first sale doctrine, defined in 
section 109 of the Act, applies only to the distribution right, not to the public 
performance right.10 Public performance rights remain with the creators of 
music beyond the point of sale. 
The PROs currently spend much of their time, as described by John 
Bowe in a recent New York Times Magazine article, going after infringers 
for violations of the public performance right and encouraging them to 
purchase license agreements permitting them to public perform music in 
exchange for fees.11 Business owners do not need to purchase license 
agreements from the PROs for each device or style of retransmission; the 
licenses cover all forms of the public performance right that the PROs can 
license on behalf of the rightsholders they represent.12 Of course, because no 
single PRO can license all of the public performance rights for music under 
copyright in the United States, business owners often have to enter into 
licensing agreements with at least two, and probably all three, of the PROs. 
Those annual costs are often at least in the hundreds, and perhaps even 
thousands, of dollars, as reported by the New York Times.13 
It has been difficult for the PROs to vigorously enforce their rights, in 
part due to the reactions of business owners and in part due to the PROs’ 
own practices. Few business owners react to PRO requests for payment 
positively. For example, in one case a business owner told a BMI account 
executive that he would come into her office and spray her down with a 
machine gun in response to her conversation regarding getting a public 
performance license.14 Other business owners choose to infringe and take a 
chance that the PROs will not pursue them, due to the practical limitations of 
tracking down each infringing establishment. Even when the PROs do locate 
infringing business owners, current PRO practices do not require the owners 
to immediately sign a license agreement and usually do not lead to 
expensive infringement suits for business owners.15 As a result, business 
owners do not seem to feel a strong need to sign up with the PROs, and 
                                                                                                                            
 10. Id. § 109(a). The language of the statute gives an owner of a copy the ability to “sell 
or otherwise dispose of” possession, rather than perform it. 
 11. John Bowe, The Music-Copyright Enforcers, N.Y. Times Mag. (Aug. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/magazine/08music-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
 12. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying the Piper, 3 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 
231, 233 (1999). 
 13. Bowe, supra note 11. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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some may not even realize that they need to pay for public performance 
rights when using digital music devices to play music. 
As Congress seems unlikely to reduce liability for business owners who 
violate the public performance right, it seems unlikely that the law will come 
in alignment with consumer understanding anytime in the near future. Thus, 
the PROs must continue to track down infringing business owners and enter 
into licensing agreements, a practice which consumes resources and creates 
resentment. As discussed above, business owners generally have an attitude 
that paying for PRO licenses is at best a discretionary expense and at worst a 
drain on revenues, especially for businesses with lean profit margins. 
Preserving the current system seems especially untenable for the two largest 
PROs, which each have a large catalog of artists whose public performance 
rights are constantly being infringed and therefore waste a great deal of 
employee time and administrative expense on enforcing those rights. The 
need for an alternate model is clear. 
B. Invisible Rights and Invisible Taxes 
The PROs are of course aware of the challenges in ensuring that 
business owners respect their clients’ public performance rights. One 
interesting solution to the current problems is the Pandora for Business 
product sold by DMX, a branding firm focused on music.16 Pandora for 
Business is a special version of the web service Pandora, which is an 
Internet radio service that allows users to choose a genre of music to listen to 
but does not allow users to control the songs that are played.17 However, the 
monthly fees associated with Pandora for Business do not make it appealing 
for all business owners, despite the product’s immunization of businesses 
from public performance liability. When faced with the option of taking 
one’s chances with the PROs versus paying for a relatively expensive third-
party service that may not be cheaper than a PRO contract, it seems 
plausible that a business owner would be willing to risk the PROs’ wrath. 
A sweeping solution that reduces the financial effects on individual 
payees would more effectively solve the problem of enforcing public 
performance rights. In his book Promises to Keep, copyright scholar and 
Harvard law professor Terry Fisher discusses several possible solutions to 
the general crisis that the digital revolution caused for the music industry. 
His favored proposal replaces the major parts of current copyright law with a 
taxation system that rewards creators.18 Broadly, the new system would 
                                                                                                                            
 16. See Pandora for Business by DMX, http://www.dmx.com/pandora/. 
 17. Pandora has entered into licensing fee arrangements with the PROs in order to avoid 
infringing public performance rights. 
 18. William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future 
of Entertainment 202–03 (2004). 
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allocate the proceeds from the tax to rightsholders by determining roughly 
how much each copyrighted work was heard or watched by consumers. 
The scope of Fisher’s proposed regime makes it politically unfeasible 
for now, but it is a fruitful starting point for more modest legislative reforms. 
Applying the concept of taxation in the public performance context would 
solve many of the problems facing the current PRO licensing model. By 
levying taxes on devices that can circumvent the public performance right 
and redistributing the proceeds from such taxes to the PROs, rightsholders 
(via the PROs) would receive revenue from all of the currently infringing 
business owners. The new system of taxation would eliminate the need for 
PRO licenses. 
Taxing devices has clear precedent and some obvious benefits. In the 
copyright context, the government has already implemented statutory 
taxation schemes on consumer products for the benefits of rightsholders—
one such scheme is taxing digital audio recording devices, such as Slingbox, 
and digital audio recording media.19 Those royalties are administered by the 
Copyright Office, which remits them to the Alliance of Artists and 
Recording Companies (“AARC”).20 This basic structure could be imported 
to the public performance context, using existing bodies to implement the 
system. The federal government has the strongest ability to levy and collect 
a nationwide tax, and collective artist organizations like the AARC or the 
PROs are in the best position to remit those proceeds to artists. Preserving 
and using the PRO structure seems practical given that the PROs do more 
than grant blanket licenses for public performance rights; they also handle 
individual licensing of music compositions. Given these other roles, 
changing the PROs revenue model from licensing agreements to taxation 
should not drastically affect the organizations’ staffing and would reduce 
enforcement costs. Further, allocating taxation revenues fairly among 
rightsholders is not an insurmountable challenge. PROs already do so with 
revenues from licensing arrangements, and as the New York Times 
described, they are already experimenting with tracking models that 
effectively estimate the play counts and fee allocations of public 
performances of copyrighted material.21 
C. Implementing a Taxation Regime 
Broadly, the new taxation scheme would function as follows. Devices 
that facilitate public performance of copyrighted material—digital music 
                                                                                                                            
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 1003(a). The rate is set at 2 percent for devices and 3 percent for media, 
with limitations on the maximum cost for devices. Id. § 1004. 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 1005; see also What is AARC?, Alliance of Artists & Recording 
Co.’s, http://wp.aarcroyalties.com/what-is-aarc/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 21. Bowe, supra note 11. 
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players, television sets, laptops, tablets, and smartphones—would be taxed 
at a specified rate. There are three obvious levels of revenue that the tax 
could seek to raise. The first system would generate an amount equal to the 
revenue generated by all PRO contracts. The second would generate an 
amount equal to the revenue lost when establishments refuse or neglect to 
enter into a license with the PROs. The third would generate an amount 
achieved by proportionally taxing all compliant and non-compliant 
businesses that are similar to restaurants, bars, and nightclubs. The third 
system would exclude sophisticated businesses like radio stations and 
concert venues, neither of which is likely to violate copyright law as often or 
as unwittingly. 
The advantage of the first system is its simplicity—it would eliminate 
the need for blanket licenses for business owners and would reduce some of 
the transaction costs described by Bowe. The advantage of the second 
system is fairness—because the second system would only seek revenues 
equal to those lost revenue from non-complaint business owners, the tax rate 
would be less than the first system. In this scenario, those business owners 
who pay for the public performance right via licenses would keep the same 
system of licenses and payments to the PROs. The third system would seek 
to raise revenue from the group of users that are legally required to enter into 
licenses with PROs and primarily use devices that facilitate infringement. 
There are some drawbacks to the second system. First, it might create a 
free-riding incentive for business owners, encouraging them to stop paying 
for licenses and see the tax rate increase marginally. However, given that 
businesses can pass off the expense of public performance licenses to 
customers, business owners would not necessarily save money by 
abandoning the licensing system and causing the tax rate under the second 
system to increase. Second, consumers might balk at paying for a tax 
designed to compensate for the behavior of bad actors. But if the first or 
third systems were implemented, consumers would have to pay a higher tax, 
so paying for scofflaws would actually be cheaper for a consumer than 
paying for nearly every business owner, as in the first and third systems.22 
In either case, a great deal of empirical analysis would be required in 
order to determine a rate that would generate revenue equal to the revenue 
from existing PRO contracts or the lost revenue from noncompliant business 
owners. In his 2004 calculations, Fisher arrived at a rate of approximately 
11.8 percent by taxing different internet service providers.23 It is possible, 
                                                                                                                            
 22. This system would also remove the need for licenses from radios, concert venues, 
and other licensees. This could benefit consumers by lowering venue entry rates and radio 
advertising rates, which would create downstream benefits for consumers in those prices but 
also increase device prices. 
 23. Fisher, supra note 18, at 221. 
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using his methods, to create a rough estimate of what an appropriate taxation 
level would be. 
The estimated tax rate for the above schemes would likely be lower than 
Fisher’s estimate for several reasons. In the years since Fisher’s estimate, 
internet use has exploded due to increased access capability throughout the 
United States and, in particular, the increase in smartphone use. 
Additionally, there is now a broader base of taxable devices, which would 
drive down the tax rate for each individual device. And further, Fisher’s 
model was based on a tax that would raise an amount equal the music 
industry’s total revenues. But in the models proposed here, the tax would 
need to raise only the portion that comes from public performance licenses. 
The Appendix provides more detail on how to estimate the appropriate 
taxation level, ending with a figure of approximately 1.76 percent.24 
The tax rate of 1.76 percent is the approximate number that would be 
required to equal the PROs’ current revenues, which is used as proxy for the 
current revenues from public performance blanket licenses. Each of the 
systems described above would have a slightly different rate. For the first 
system, the tax rate would have to be higher than 1.76 percent because some 
revenue is not being collected at present. The third system would also need 
to be higher, assuming that the revenue generated by radio stations and 
concert venues is less than the revenue lost by non-complaint businesses. 
For the second system, the tax rate would change depending on how much 
of the market is compliant—it would be higher than 1.76 percent if fewer 
than half of businesses are currently obtaining licenses from the PROs lower 
if more than half of businesses are currently obtaining licenses. 
Because revenue streams and device prices are constantly fluctuating, 
the tax rate would need to be recalibrated based on changing economic 
conditions. Under current law, the Copyright Royalty Board—a panel 
composed of three administrative law judges—makes determinations 
regarding royalty rates set by provisions of copyright law.25 Expanding the 
Board’s responsibilities to also adjust a tax rate on devices would comport 
with the current legislative goals of copyright law. Alternatively, the Board 
could institute a dynamic rule that would recalibrate the tax rate to changing 
uses and prices for devices. 
Finally, the tax rate need not be equivalent for all four categories of 
devices. In his proposal, Fisher suggests a Ramsey pricing scheme to tax 
specific classes of devices at different rates.26 Fisher explains that, by 
designing a system, a Ramsey scheme in this context would “make the tax 
rates applicable to the various devices . . . inversely proportional to the 
                                                                                                                            
 24. See infra Appendix. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006). 
 26. Fisher, supra note 18, at 222–23. 
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elasticity of demand for each.”27 In practical terms, this would mean that 
devices that consumers felt were more central to their lifestyles would be 
taxed a higher rate, because consumers would be willing to pay more money 
for those devices, reaching the Ramsey goal of minimizing changes in 
consumer behavior. Conversely, devices with less demand would be taxed at 
a lower rate.28 
Conclusion: Taxation Criticisms and  
the Likelihood of Adoption 
One criticism of creating a taxation system is that it would unfairly tax 
individuals who do not necessarily infringe the public performance right of 
rightsholders. If a consumer buys an iPod and uses it only for personal use, 
they would not be publicly performing any work, yet they would be paying 
the compulsory tax. In essence, consumers would be paying for a privilege 
that they might never exercise. This may seem an unfair or excessive 
solution in order to remedy the behavior of bad actors.29 
But there are several reasons why “spreading the tax” around to 
individuals who may not necessarily need to pay it makes sense. First, 
Americans already pay taxes in order to fund programs that they may never 
use. An obvious example of this is Social Security: some Americans will 
certainly die before they become eligible to receive Social Security benefits. 
Second, the public performance right does get “used” by individuals who 
don’t directly contribute to paying for licenses—the general public. When an 
individual walks into a coffee shop and hears a piece of music, that 
individual is enjoying the song and benefitting from the public performance 
for free. The business owner is legally required to pay for a license to 
publicly perform the work, and at least theoretically could pass along the 
cost of obtaining a license to customers. However, given the issues 
surrounding supply and demand and consumer sophistication in comparing 
prices, it is not at all certain that the entire cost of PRO licenses is passed on 
to consumers. Additionally, noncompliant business owners almost certainly 
do not take into account the cost of the foregone licenses when pricing their 
goods and services, especially given that businesses may not even know they 
are infringing until the PROs track them down. Therefore, forcing 
individuals to pay for public performance rights more effectively allocates 
pricing among the actors who enjoy the right itself. 
                                                                                                                            
 27. Id. at 223. 
 28. Id. 
 29. For example, assuming that noncompliant businesses constitute 1 percent of the 
total purchases of portable music players. Then, only 1 percent of the population that “should” 
pay the tax actually pays it. In that sense, it seems inelegantly designed. 
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Another potential criticism of this proposal is feasibility. Though the 
taxation system is relatively easy to grasp theoretically, its construction 
would require a great deal of cooperation from multiple actors. The PROs, 
rightsholders, businesses, device manufacturers, and consumers would all 
need to develop new statutory language and taxation models. The current 
PRO system makes the taxation system somewhat easier than Fisher’s 
proposal to put into effect, but the political difficulties in doing so would 
certainly make it a challenge. 
There are undoubtedly more effective ways to remit revenues from 
public performance rights than sending PRO agents toting licensing 
agreements to every infringing small business in the country. And a statutory 
modification of the public performance right to indemnify such infringement 
seems unlikely in today’s political climate. Instead, creating a minor change 
to copyright law—the creation of a tax on devices that play digital music 
files, with proceeds payable to PROs—would both decrease infringement 
and allow business owners to continue to play music off their devices by 
levying a modest price against owners and consumers. 
Appendix 
Echoing Terry Fisher’s rough calculations, let us use the following 
numbers to estimate what an appropriate taxation level would be. We would 
need to know (1) the total revenues that PROs obtained from public 
performance licenses, (2) the number of digital devices sold that would need 
to be taxed, and (3) the “lost revenues” from noncompliant businesses. 
Unfortunately, exact numbers for any of these three categories is 
unavailable, but a rough estimate can be created for the first two. 
For the fiscal year 2011, ASCAP reported revenues of $985 million and 
BMI reported revenues of $931 million.30 SESAC did not report revenues, 
but assuming that it has a 5 percent share of the total revenues (given its 
much smaller size), SESAC would have had revenues of $101 million. Total 
revenues would be $2.017 billion. Let us assume that the tax would need to 
compensate for the total PRO revenue—this is an overestimate, but will give 
a sense of what the desired figure should be. 
The number of taxable digital devices sold in the United States is also 
difficult to estimate with precision. The categories of digital devices that 
would be deemed taxable in this context would likely be smartphones, MP3 
players, tablets, and computers. Prices for three categories have been 
roughly estimated. Total sales for each category, on either a quarterly or 
annual basis, were estimated as follows: 
                                                                                                                            
 30. Press Release, BMI, BMI Reports Increased Revenues for Fiscal Year 2011 
(Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/552802; Press Release, 
ASCAP, ASCAP Reports Increased Revenues in 2011 (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http:// 
www.ascap.com/Press/2012/0308_ascap-reports.aspx. 
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Device  
Type 
Estimated  
Quarter Sales 
Estimated  
Annual Sales 
Estimated  
Average Price 
Estimated  
Annual Revenue 
Computers 17,929,764 units 71,719,056 $652 $46,760,824,512 
Tablets - 13,600,000 - $8,100,000,000 
Smartphones - 420,000,000 $135 $56,700,000,000 
MP3 Players 11,186,000 units 44,744,000 $67.50 $3,020,220,000 
   Total Estimated 
Revenue 
$114,581,044,512 
 
With a total estimated desired revenue of $114,581,044,512 and a 
desired taxation revenue of $2,017,000,000, the tax rate would need to be 
approximately 1.76 percent (or 2,017,000,000 divided by 114,581,044,512). 
